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The Civil Rights Movement had a variety of transformative effects on the
way federal courts hear and decide cases; among them was the introduction of
quantitative analysis as a staple of certain types of high-profile adjudication,
particularly in redistricting cases.' The first judicial foray into regulating the
drawing of electoral districts-the "one person, one vote" line of cases-was
premised on an equality norm expressed in explicitly numerical terms.2 In these
cases, the Supreme Court settled3 on numerical guidelines requiring only simple
arithmetic to implement.4 Since then, however, the federal judiciary has
* Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Griswold 504, 1525 Massachusetts
Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138, jgreiner@law.harvard.edu.
1. See Bernard Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting Rights
Case Law, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT IN
PERSPECTIVE 197-229 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992)
(discussing the role of expert witness testimony in redistricting cases).
2. The equality norm requires districts to have equal (or roughly equal) populations;
otherwise, according to the theory, one person's vote would count more than
another's in terms of power to elect a representative. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sand-
ers, 376 U.S. 1, 2 (1964) ("[T]his inequality of population means that [one Geor-
gia] Congressman has to represent from two to three times as many people as do
Congressmen from some of the other Georgia districts.").
3. At least, this appears to be the case. But see Larios v. Cox, 30o F. Supp. 2d 1320,
1340-47 (N.D. Ga. 2004), affd, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (striking down a districting
scheme despite the fact that its departures from population equality were within
what were previously thought to be acceptable limits).
4. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983) (articulating, for state and
local districts, a standard that depends on a comparison of a plan's least populous
and most populous districts to a district of ideal size, and imposing a burden on
the state to justify a plan when differences in population exceed 10%); Wesberry,
376 U.S. at 8 (using the same ideal district size as a baseline for congressional
districts but essentially invalidating any departure from ideal size).
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engaged with increasingly complicated quantitative measurements and
statistical techniques, first in the racial vote dilution cases, then in the "overuse
of race" cases,6 then in the partisan gerrymandering cases.
5. Racial vote dilution (referred to in this Essay as simply "vote dilution") is the
drawing of districts such that, despite compliance with "one person one vote"
limits, members of a racial or ethnic group lack an equal opportunity to elect
candidates of choice. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). For
foundational vote dilution cases, see, for example, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30 (1986); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124 (1971). In the vote dilution context, the Supreme Court's reliance on
quantitative measurements of voting patterns by race has been consistent. See,
e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399> 427
(20o6); Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 52-53, 80-83. By "quantitative measurements of vot-
ing patterns by race," I mean comparisons of turnout and support rates of various
racial groups.
6. In this line of cases, the Supreme Court established the unconstitutionality of dis-
trict lines drawn from a process in which race is the predominant factor.
Throughout this Essay, I use the term "overuse of race" to reflect this idea that
race cannot be a predominant factor in district-line-drawing. Evidence of predo-
minance can come from a district's bizarre shape or from the circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of the districting scheme. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno , 509 U.S. 630 (1993). On the availability of useful
evidence in the form of quantitative measurements of district shape in this line of
jurisprudence, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bi-
zarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 565 (1993). In the "overuse of race" context,
the Supreme Court has relied on studies involving quantitative measurements of
district shape. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 960 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(citing measurements in Pildes & Niemi, supra, at 565, tbl.3); see also infra note 11
for further explanation.
7. Partisan gerrymandering is the practice of drawing district lines so as to minimize
the electoral strength of one or more political parties, often by packing as many of
those parties' supporters into as few districts as possible (thus creating inefficient
super-majorities in these districts). See, e.g., LULAC 548 U.S. 399; Vieth v. Jubelir-
er, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). In the partisan
gerrymandering context, Justice Stevens has endorsed a partisan symmetry mea-
surement susceptible to quantitative estimation as useful in assessing the extent of
the plan's partisanship, while other Justices have also shown some interest in the
symmetry standard. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 466-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 420 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 483 (Souter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). For an explanation of partisan symmetry and of
models available to assess it, see Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method
of Evaluating Electoral Systems and Redistricting Plans, 38 Am. J. POL. ScI. 514
(1994); Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judi-
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If one treats Baker v. Carr' as the beginning of this era of judicial involve-
ment in redistricting and of courts' growing reliance on quantitative expertise,
we have just short of half a century of experience in redistricting litigation that
frequently, perhaps usually, requires the use of complex quantitative thinking.
With a new round of redistricting underway, it is now worth assessing the state
of the empirics in this area and asking the following question: In the foreseeable
future, are the empirical methods that are either currently available or likely to
be developed sufficient to allow judges to adjudicate cases according to articu-
lated doctrine, and to further the policies underlying that doctrine?
In this short Policy Essay, I argue that, despite good news in the form of
increasing sophistication of quantitative thinking and the continued develop-
ment of proposals for doctrine that can make use of these techniques, there is
reason for pessimism. I discuss three such reasons: (i) the difficulty in making
new quantitative techniques accessible to judges; (ii) the threat that demo-
graphic and election administration changes pose to the informational inputs of
these quantitative techniques; and (iii) the fact that we are unlikely ever to be
able to answer what I deem to be the fundamental question in redistricting:
What is the role (if any) of racial animus, prejudice, or unconscious bias in
voting patterns and elections? Further, I argue that the empirical challenges in
this area constitute a previously unexplored reason for renewed investigation
into the limited and selective9 adoption of multi-membered districts with alter-
native vote aggregation schemes, 0 the hope being that such institutional designs
might obviate the need for some of the controversy and litigation surrounding
future redistricting.
I proceed by reviewing the good news in the empirics of redistricting before
turning to the bad news. I conclude with some thoughts regarding multi-
membered districts with alternative vote aggregation schemes.
8. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9. By "selective," I mean that the use of multi-membered districts with alternative
voting schemes be limited to circumstances: (i) in which district size can be kept
manageable; and (ii) in which there is evidence of a possible violation of existing
districting law (or extreme partisan gerrymandering).
10. "Multi-membered" districts are those in which more than one representative is
elected from a particular district. When each voter is allowed (or even required)
to cast the same number of votes as there are representatives to be elected, and
when voters cannot cast more than one of their votes for a single candidate,
multi-membered districts can be powerful tools of racial vote dilution. See Thorn-
burg, 478 U.S. 30, at 46-51. In this Essay, I refer to such systems as "one vote per
slot" schemes. "Alternative vote aggregation schemes" are those that depart from
a set of rules allowing (or requiring) voters to cast the same number of votes as
there are representatives to be elected and prohibiting voters from casting more
than one of their votes for a single candidate. I discuss two examples of such
alternative schemes, "limited voting" and "cumulative voting," at the end of this
Essay. See infra Part III.
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I. THE GOOD NEWS
At first glance, the news from the empirical side of redistricting appears
good. Perhaps because of the stakes and high profile of redistricting disputes,
the quantitative community has responded to the judiciary's implicit demand
for more and better information. Statisticians and quantitative analysis experts
have adapted increasingly sophisticated numerical thinking to the redistricting
setting by grounding their research in lessons learned from actual redistricting
events and by developing proposals for legal doctrine on the basis of the
detailed information that has become available." At least four lessons can be
drawn from these efforts.
First, statistical tools now available allow us to know more than we did
before. For example, prior to the new millennium, the statistical techniques
used in vote dilution law to discern whether voting was racially polarized
performed well" only for jurisdictions with two relevant racial or ethnic
groups.13 At present, we have techniques that can perform well for multira-
cial/ethnic polities if we have adequate data.14 Furthermore, in the area of
district shape, technology has evolved to allow ranking of districts according to
their compactness under dozens of definitions of "compact."
Second, and of underappreciated importance, tools now available do a
better job of warning us when the data cannot provide useful information. For
ii. For example, even before the Supreme Court arguably elevated district shape to
potential constitutional significance in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), political
scientists were identifying dozens of measures of compactness and assessing their
consequences for gerrymandering by examining past district shapes. See, e.g., Ri-
chard Niemi, Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci & Thomas Hofeller, Measuring
Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Ra-
cial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POLITICS 1155 (1990). The term "compactness" can mean
various things, but generally refers to the regularity of the shape of the district, as
well as some comparison of the perimeter of the district to its area. Regularity of
shape can also be quantified in various ways, but often involves a comparison of
district boundaries to some kind of geometric figure that is pleasing to the eye,
such as the smallest circle that contains the entire district, or the largest circle en-
tirely contained in the district. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 6, at 562-74. In
another example, Gary King applied Bayesian statistical thinking and simulation-
based fitting algorithms to the problem of discerning racial voting patterns. See
GARY KING, A SOLUTION TO THE ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE PROBLEM: RECON-
STRUCTING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR FROM AGGREGATE DATA (1997).
12. I use the phrase "perform well" in the sense of performing well enough given the
inherent limits of the data available. For a view that "well" in this sense is not
good enough, see David A. Freedman et al., Ecological Regression and Voting
Rights, 15 EVALUATION REV. 673 (1991).
13. See D. James Greiner, Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting: Empirics and Legal Doc-
trine in the Melting Pot, 86 IND. L.J. 447, 465-68 (2011).
14. See Greiner, supra note 13, at 470-72.
530
29:527 2011
THE QUANTITATIVE EMPIRICS OF REDISTRICTING LITIGATION
example, in the vote dilution context, a critical quantity of interest is the frac-
tion of a racial group's voters who supported a particular candidate, a quantity
that by definition must lie between o.oo and i.oo. If a modern, reliable statistical
technique can tell us nothing more than that this fraction for a particular racial
group is 950/ likely to be between o.oi and 0.99, we can conclude that the avail-
able data are unlikely to provide useful information. 6 Techniques used early in
vote dilution jurisprudence did a less effective job of providing warning signs of
this nature.17 Similarly, in the area of measuring the partisan bias of redistricting
plans, we can test potential models and specifications (including which
variables to use as predictors in modeling equations) that forecast the partisan
effects of different redistricting plans against known results. We can learn from
instances in which particular model specifications are found wanting." For
example, if for a particular jurisdiction we observe a pattern of repeated failure
to predict observed results, we can be cautious in drawing conclusions.
Third, quantitative tools now available continue to form the foundation for
theoretical proposals that provide courts with previously unavailable (or at least
unarticulated) doctrinal options. Decades ago, quantitatively minded political
scientists and politically minded legal academics provided the theoretical
scaffolding for the construction of what would become modern vote dilution
law.' 9 One can hope that this kind of dialogue will continue in the area of parti-
san gerrymandering.2 o
Finally, the increasing availability of districting software and election
information may allow watchdogs in academia2 ' and elsewhere both to draw
15. See, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 703-o6 (7 th Cir. 1998).
16. These figures come from a real-world example, specifically, the fraction of Asian-
American voters in Boston that supported Deval Patrick in the 2006 Democratic
primary in Boston. The name of the modern technique used was the "GQ Model."
See Greiner, supra note 13, at 475.
17. Or perhaps the warning signs they did provide were not adequately heeded. See D.
James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We
Now, and Where Do We Want to Be?, 47 JURIMETRICS 117,132-33 (2007).
18. See, e.g., Andrew C. Thomas, Avoiding an Electoral Lost Decade: What Lessons
Will We Learn in the 2011 Redistricting Cycle?, at 4 fig.i (Feb. 7, 2011) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1757313.
19. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51-6o (1986) (citing numerous publications
and data analyses by political scientists and legal academics using concepts devel-
oped with quantitative political science techniques).
20. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Gary King et al. in Support of Neither Party,
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (Nos. 05-204, 05-254, 05-276, 05-439), availa-
ble at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl-s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload5oo/
557/Brief Amici Curiae Professors KingGrofmanGelmanKatz.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Rick Hasen, DrawCongress.org, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Mar. 1, 2011, 9:43
AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/oi8868.html (describing classes at Har-
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their own proposed districts and to examine with greater sophistication the
results of official processes.
II. THE BAD NEWS
Despite all of the positive developments in statistical techniques described
above, the bad news may already, or may soon, outweigh the good in this area.
Some sources of bad news, such as the fact that better technology has made it
easier for official line-drawers to engage in self-serving or illegal line drawing, 2
are obvious. More subtle sources of bad news, however, are more serious in
terms of their threat to adjudication. I focus on three such sources here: (i) dif-
ficulties in making the more complex modern quantitative techniques accessi-
ble to judges; (ii) threats to these techniques' informational inputs; and (iii) the
realization that it is unlikely that through the use of sophisticated statistical
techniques we will ever be able to answer a critical question underlying much of
redistricting litigation: What is the role (if any) of racial animus, prejudice, or
unconscious bias in determining voting patterns and elections?
A. Complexity of Modern Quantitative Techniques
Many of the advances described above consist of, or are based on, numeri-
cal thinking that is quantum steps more complicated than that used before, and
the federal judiciary has struggled to respond. Sometimes it has gotten things
flatly wrong. 3 At other times, courts (and indeed some experts) have been
willing to consider the results of recently constructed but more informative
methods only if the conclusions from the modern techniques corroborate the
results of the less informative methods with which courts are familiar-a
vard, Columbia, and Yale law schools in which students are drawing "good gov-
ernment" districts for the House of Representatives in every state).
22. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 355 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
23. For example, in Vieth, Justice Scalia characterized a proposed symmetry standard
for partisan bias as "rest[ing] upon the principle that groups (or at least political-
action groups) have a right to proportional representation." 541 U.S. at 288. In
other words, Justice Scalia thought that the symmetry standard required that if
Democrats received 55% of the votes cast, they must receive 55% of the legislative
seats. But the symmetry standard requires no such thing. Instead, the symmetry
standard is consistent with allocating Democrats 75% of the legislative seats for
winning 55% of the votes cast, so long as Republicans would also receive 75% of the
legislative seats if they won 55% of the votes cast. All of this is explained in the Brief
of Amici Curiae, supra note 20, at 7-8. The Court's struggles to understand empir-
ical findings and/or methods are not limited to redistricting. See, e.g., Theodore
Eisenberg, Michael Heise & Martin T. Wells, Variability in Punitive Damages: Em-
pirically Assessing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 166 J. INsT'L & THEORETICAL
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posture that renders the more informative methods pointless. 4 These difficul-
ties suggest that while increased sophistication may provide more accurate
information, it may also worsen the already strained process of communicating
statistical methodologies to judges.
B. Informational Inputs
Another threat to adjudicating cases accurately and to furthering the
policies underlying redistricting doctrine comes from an increased difficulty in
obtaining the data that are the lifeblood of the quantitative techniques in use.
This threat is perhaps clearest in the area of vote dilution litigation, which by
definition depends on information about voting patterns by race. As I have
discussed elsewhere, the increasingly multiracial nature of U.S. polities, as well
as allegations of decreasing ferocity of white bloc voting, have threatened the
continuing viability of quantitative techniques measuring voting behavior by
race that depend on the combination of precinct-level Census data and
election results. 5 At some cost, where "cost" refers to time, effort, money, and
delay in obtaining information, polling of various forms provides critical
information on voting patterns. In regions6 and contests where polling can be
informative, polling should and must take on a greater role in redistricting
litigation. But a variety of factors threaten the ability to evaluate voter behavior.
For example, the convenience voting movement threatens exit polling by
removing voting activity from traditional polling places. Furthermore, both
the growing use of cell phones and their portability complicate telephone
polls by making it harder to match poll respondents to geographic locations."
24. See, e.g., United States v. City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d 584, 598 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(agreeing with an expert who testified that one should rely on the results of a
more advanced statistical method only if the results agree with those of an older,
less informative method). For an explanation of the specific methods involved in
City of Euclid, see Greiner, supra note 17, at 126-42.
25. See Greiner, supra note 13. The threat is that these techniques give wrong answers
or no useful answers.
26. For example, exit polling in Oregon might not be a fruitful endeavor. See Official
Results: November 3, 1998 General Election, State Measure 60, OR. SEC'Y STATE,
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/pages/history/archive/nov3l998/other.info/
m6o.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2011) (discussing the fact that most voting in Ore-
gon is done by mail).
27. See Paul Gronke, Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, Peter A. Miller & Daniel Toffey,
Convenience Voting, ii ANN. REV. OF POL. Sci. 437 (2008).
28. See, e.g., Scott Keeter, Cell Phones and the 2008 Vote: An Update, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Jul. 17, 2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/9o1/cell-phones-polling-
election-2008; see also Fako & Assocs., Inc., Cell Phones & Political Polling, NEW
FROM POL. POLLING BLOG - F&A, INc. (Jul. 18, 2007, 12:48 PM), http://
politicalpolling.blogspot.com/2007/o7/cell-phones-political-polling.html ("Cellu-
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Additionally, the inequality in internet access across demographic groups
threatens to induce bias in online polling.'9 These factors suggest that polling
may now provide only a partial response to the threat to informational inputs
articulated above.
There are other threats to the information upon which vote dilution litiga-
tion rests. At least at smaller levels of aggregation, obtaining information on
citizenship rates by race has become problematic because the U.S. Census
Bureau no longer collects citizenship as part of the Decennial Census. Despite
this fact, courts have already required, or seem poised to require, vote dilution
analysis to proceed on the basis of statistics regarding only the population of
voting-age citizens.30 Meanwhile, problems associated with an increasing
number of persons who self-identify as belonging to more than one racial
group, an issue which academics identified in the 2000 redistricting round but
which did not end up posing serious issues then, are likely to increase.3
Outside of the vote dilution area, information challenges are even more
subtle. For instance, one might think that in the "overuse of race" line of cases,
the most important quantities of interest are measurements of district com-
pactness, which depend on now-established Geographic Information System
techniques and thus pose no informational challenges. But if the decade-long
litigation over North Carolina's post-1990 congressional districts taught us
nothing else, it taught us that in districting, everything depends on everything
else.32 Litigation concerning the "overuse of race" hinges on the reasons why
line-drawers drew the lines they did. Line-drawers may justify their choices by
articulating permissible (perhaps) motivations, such as the desire to elect repre-
sentatives of a favored party or a desire to protect incumbents. But it may be
difficult to separate these partisan considerations from impermissible racial
motivations in a reliable way-race and partisan preferences are often highly
correlated, so a desire to produce the hoped-for partisan consequences can
cause line-drawers to consider race. But the consideration of race can trigger
vote dilution concerns. In this sense, partisan district drawing may critically
depend on assumptions about correlations between race and vote preferences
that might feel like racial stereotyping. Thus, litigation that begins as a "simple"
lar phones are also not tied to a geographic location and create difficulties in
screening eligible participants.").
29. See, e.g., Matthias Schonlau et al., Selection Bias in Web Surveys and the Use of
Propensity Scores, 37 Soc. METHODS & RES. 291 (2009).
30. Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How To Count, What To Count, Whom
To Count, and Where To Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755, 757, 780 (2011).
31. See id. at 772-73.
32. North Carolina's 12' Congressional District was redrawn several times in response
to litigation. See North Carolina Redistricting Cases: The 199os, REDISTRICTING
TASK FORCE NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/
departments/scr/redist/redsum/ncsum.htm (last updated Jul. 8, 2003).
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exercise of considering district shape can implicate a host of extraordinarily
complicated issues that depend on quantitative analysis.
Thus, in Easley v. Cromartie, the Supreme Court held that the allegedly
irregular shape of North Carolina's redrawn 12 congressional district was pri-
marily motivated by partisan, not racial, concerns.33 Litigation over the 12th
district had begun with a successful "overuse of race" claim.3 4 The lines redrawn
in response to the successful "overuse of race" claim were again challenged.35
The defense argued that the district's shape reflected a desire to produce certain
partisan-not racial-outcomes.36 Producing partisan outcomes, the defense's
argument ran, required line-drawers to locate the most loyally Democratic
voters in particular districts. But, according to the defense, because the most
predictably loyal Democratic voters were black, the line-drawers could take race
(among other factors) into account when trying to predict future partisan
behavior.1 For the plaintiffs, however, the fact that blacks were placed in certain
districts was not an accidental byproduct of the scheme; rather, they argued that
the whole districting effort had been dominated by the desire to concentrate
blacks in certain districts."8 Accordingly, to adjudicate the case, the Court had to
make judgments regarding not just the existence of a correlation between race
and voting preferences, and not just the strength of that association, but also the
reliability of that association over time. That is, the Court had to decide how
likely members of a certain racial group were to defect from previously
expressed partisan indicators (for example, a black or white registered Demo-
crat voting for a Republican). Doing so compelled the Court to make finer
judgments about race and voting behavior than are required in the typical vote
dilution lawsuit,3 9 despite the fact that the "overuse of race" cause of action
purportedly does not turn on the presence of racial bloc voting. 40 Such judg-
ments implicate all of the informational challenges associated with drawing in-
ferences about voting patterns by race discussed previously and below.
33. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
34. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
35. Easley, 532 U.S. 234.
36. Id. at 243-54.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 238-39, 254-56.
39. Id. at 245 ("[W]hite voters registered as Democrats 'cross-over' to vote for a
Republican candidate more often than do African-Americans, who register and
vote Democratic between 95% and 97% of the time.").
40. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). In
both of these cases, the Supreme Court articulated the "overuse of race" doctrine
without addressing racial bloc voting.
535
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
C. The Fundamentally Unanswerable Question
Perhaps the most important thing that the past five decades have taught us,
or should have taught us, is that quantitative techniques and technological
advances have limits. 4' As a result of these limits, there are questions that we are
unlikely ever to be able to answer. One of these issues, which appears in a varie-
ty of forms, is so fundamental that the others pale in comparison: the extent to
which animus, stereotyping, or subconscious bias underlies voting patterns.
Why are voting choices and race correlated (if and where they are)? Is it "race,
not politics"? 42 What are the "explanations of the reasons why white voters
rejected minority candidates"? 43 When is observed voting behavior the result of
"interest- group politics rather than ... racial discrimination"? 44 Is a sustained
pattern of failure of minority-preferred candidates due evidence of hardened
white voter preferences or "a mere euphemism for defeat at the polls"?45 These
are all different ways of asking the same question46 and in an uncomfortable
way, this question may be built into both existing redistricting doctrine, as well
as what that doctrine should be. The clearest example of this point is a
series of lower court rulings holding that the "reasons for" racial voting patterns
are relevant in a vote dilution case, although these lower courts disagree on
exactly what role these "reasons" should play in adjudication, as well as where
doctrinally these "reasons" fit.47 Despite early' and continuing49 optimism that
41. For example, by now we should understand that we will never be able to compu-
terize our way out of redistricting difficulties, despite early optimism in that direc-
tion. Compare William Vickrey, On the Prevention of Gerrymandering, 76 POL. ScI.
Q. 105, 110 (1961) (proposing that algorithms and computers be used as an anti-
dote to "maneuver[ing] in terms of back-room bargaining"), with Micah Altman,
Karin MacDonald & Michael McDonald, From Crayons to Computers: The Evolu-
tion of Computer Use in Redistricting, 23 Soc. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 334, 342 (2005)
("[R]edistricting remains an extremely difficult computational problem. No
algorithm is known to exist that produces optimal plans for any redistricting
problem of realistic size, and because of the sheer mathematical complexity of
redistricting, it is unlikely that the computational problem of redistricting will be
solved, at least for tasks such as redistricting large states at the block level.").
42. Easley, 532 U.S. at 244.
43. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, loo (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by
Burger, C.J., Powell & Rehnquist, JJ.).
44. Id. at 82 (White, J., concurring).
45. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971).
46. Note that by addressing how to draw inferences in this area, I do not concede that
the question is coherent or in any way well-posed.
47. See Greiner, supra note 13, at 459-60.
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quantitative methods would be able to answer this question, we are at present
no closer to knowing how to answer it in an individual piece of litigation than
we were when it was first posed at least four decades ago. 0 There are three basic
reasons for this result.
First, we do not observe how individuals vote; indeed, except in overwhel-
mingly segregated areas, we do not even observe how racial and ethnic groups
vote. The secret ballot, by design, prevents that.5
Second, we do not have a clear definition of the inferential target: What
does it mean to say that race played a role in a voter's decision? Does it mean
that if the public's perception of a candidate's race had been different, a voter's
choice would have been different? Does it mean that if the voter's race had been
different, her choice would have been different? For a causal inference based on
data, we need a reasonably well-defined counterfactual that we can relate to
available data, and in this area, we do not have one.
Third, to isolate the effect of race in voting (assuming that we could define
what we mean), we would need to know what other factors cause people to vote
the way they do. But we do not have good information on this score, either.
In light of these problems, we are left to ask: What useful information will
we have available to address these questions of racial bias or animus in the
context of an individual case? Occasionally (even in the current era), we have
what seem like non-quantitative smoking guns demonstrating the presence of
racial animus: campaign messages to voters that clearly implicate race.54 But
while such appeals may seem to speak loudly when they are present, it is hard to
tell whether their absence suggests a lack of racial bias or simply a desire not to
49. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
50. See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. 124.
51. See Stephen P. Klein et al., Ecological Regression Versus the Secret Ballot, 31 JURIME-
TRICs 393 (1991).
52. See D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV.
533, 592-93 (2008). Note that the problems of not knowing how individuals vote,
and of not knowing what it means to say that racial animus causes something in a
way reasonably testable with quantitative methods, are built into the structure of
the way we currently administer voting in the United States. Thus, these problems
are unlikely to be solved by the kind of accumulation of personal data on voters
underway among information vendors.
53. Note that being able to predict how an individual will likely vote is different from
knowing why an individual votes as she does. The fact that a person voted for Al
Gore in 2000, John Kerry in 2004, and Barack Obama in 2008 might be a powerful
predictor of how she will vote in 2012, but one would not say that these past votes
"caused" the future one.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 436-37
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (reporting a campaign flyer distributed by a candidate for Trustee
in a city that had experienced recent growth in its Hispanic community claiming
that " [t]he Hispanics are running the show already").
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appear too racist. In some contexts, we can compare the party vote share in an
electorate when a candidate of color runs to the share earned by a white
candidate of the same party in the same electorate (but in a different time and
electoral contest). But these comparisons are rarely available for the particular
office that is the subject of a lawsuit, and as just noted, they often involve
comparing different candidates' performances at different points in time." It is
dangerous to draw strong conclusions based on comparisons across time and
office.,'
One might argue in response that the question of the presence and causal
role of racial animus in an electorate affects only vote dilution cases, where such
animus can induce a racial bloc to minimize the electoral strength of other
groups, and that this question is not as fundamental in other areas of redistrict-
ing law. But again, in redistricting, everything depends on everything else. As
suggested above, concerns over partisanship affect even "one person, one vote"
adjudication, which is supposedly straightforward. 7 Moreover, partisanship is a
defense in the "overuse of race" line of cases, and proving partisanship can
mean proving racial bloc voting." To understand whether a districting scheme
is allegedly too partisan, one must understand line-drawers' consideration of
race, given that in some jurisdictions a feigned or real desire to comply with the
Voting Rights Act may lead to packing of Democratic-leaning voters. 9 In sum,
if we cannot successfully address racial concerns through redistricting, we may
not be able to address much else.
III. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE?
In this Essay, I have argued that some important problems related to the
empirics of districting have always been difficult, and are getting harder to
answer. I conclude by suggesting that the observed limitations of quantitative
empirical techniques should be a factor in determining legal doctrine. It is a
fruitless endeavor for courts to adopt a doctrine that requires information that
55. In other words, we may have precinct-level data across the nation on vote counts
for John Kerry's and Barack Obama's presidential runs, but are these contests
sufficiently similar to each other to isolate a race effect, and even if they are, why
should we believe that information about a presidential contest signals anything
about voter behavior in a city council election?
56. For a study at high levels of aggregation, see Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel
Persily & Charles Stewart III, Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2oo8 Election:
Implications for the Future of the VotingRights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1385 (2010).
57. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
58. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
59. For a discussion of how this concern can be either real or illusory, see Bernard
Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right if He Had Said: "When It Comes
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cannot be provided even by the most sophisticated statistical methods.6 Thus, I
suggest that the empirical challenges in this area provide an additional argu-
ment to explore at least a selective and limited use6' of alternatives to our
current system of single-membered districts or multi-membered districts with
"one vote per slot"": multi-membered districts with vote aggregation schemes
such as limited voting3 and cumulative voting.4
In the past, arguments in favor of vote aggregation schemes other than
one vote per slot" have come from experts in race, politics and law;" from
election law scholars and doctrinalists;" and from political scientists with
decades of experience in redistricting,6 7 among others. The broad lesson from
these sources is that alternative voting schemes offer greater flexibility and lesser
need for constant judicial monitoring. For example, in a cumulative voting
system, if racial bloc voting exists, then a member of a particular racial group
can cast all of her votes for one (or a limited number of) racially defined candi-
60. Greiner, supra note 13, at 470-72.
61. By "selected and limited use," I mean the use of these methods in locations in
which there is evidence of illegal line-drawing, particularly in smaller jurisdic-
tions, such as cities, towns, and counties. See Florence P. Adams, Minorities and
Representation in the New Millennium, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLEN-
NIUM 155, 155 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005) (arguing that "much of the controver-
sy" in Voting Rights Act jurisprudence in this century "will be found at the local
level of government"). With respect to redistricting plans that must be drawn
statewide (such as state legislative districts or congressional districts), other
concerns, such as ballot complication and geographical proximity of a voter to her
representative, become relevant. In these systems, we should explore the use of a
combination of multi-membered and single-membered districts, with the multi-
membered districts in areas in which illegal line-drawing is a serious concern.
62. For my definition of "one vote per slot," see supra note l0.
63. Limited voting allows each voter to cast a number of votes smaller than the
number of seats to be elected from the geographic location in which the voter
votes. See United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 755 (N.D.
Ohio 2009).
64. Cumulative voting provides a voter with more than one vote in a multi-seat
contest but permits the voter to allocate more than one vote to a particular candi-
date. See Richard L. Engstrom, Delbert A. Taebel & Richard L. Cole, Cumulative
Voting as a Remedyfor Minority Vote Dilution: The Case ofAlamogordo, New Mex-
ico, 5 J.L. & POL. 469, 476-77 (1989).
65. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIR-
NESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
66. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Engineering the Endgame, 1o9 MICH. L. REV. 349, 382 &
n.180, 383-85 (2010).
67. See, e.g., Richard L. Engstrom, Missing the Target The Supreme Court, "One
Person, One Vote," and Partisan Gerrymandering, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM, supra note 61, at 313.
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dates of choice. If, however, racial bloc voting in this jurisdiction decreases,
then this same voter can begin to spread her votes among different candidates.
No change in electoral structure is needed to allow this transition. In contrast,
with single-membered districts drawn to remedy an allegation of vote dilution,
the line drawing has been implemented to reflect racial voting patterns of a
particular point in time. If the racial nature of voting patterns decreases, and the
desire is to have lines that reflect some other political cleavage,68 the lines will
almost certainly have to be redrawn. Recently, and particularly in smaller,
municipal jurisdictions, defendants have proposed, and courts have accepted,
one or more of these methods as remedies for violations of section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act.6 9
Putting aside empirical considerations, these arguments have serious force.
The supposed choice between single-membered districts and "one vote per slot"
multi-membered districts has always ignored the availability of alternative
methods of aggregating votes. The federal court preference for single-
membered districts as a remedy appears to have been the result of unsupported
assumptions70 about the defects of multi-membered districts dating back to
decisions in the "one person, one vote" line of cases.7' Furthermore, the prefe-
rence for single-membered districting has never been one of constitutional
magnitude.72 And at the time of this preference's incorporation into vote
dilution jurisprudence, the academic literature upon which the Supreme Court
relied appeared to justify it primarily as a clear and manageable way of limiting
68. Alternative cleavages might include party, economic class, or religion.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(cumulative voting); United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740
(N.D. Ohio 2009) (limited voting); Engstrom, supra note 67, at 333-34.
70. Both the articulation of these concerns and their lack of firm empirical support
were later repeated in articles on which the Supreme Court relied for the exten-
sion of this preference. See, e.g., Malcolm E. Jewell, The Consequences of Single-
and Multi-member Districting, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES
129, 130 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982) (cited in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 47 (1986)).
71. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1975); see also East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd.
v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 639 (1976) (collecting cases). Thornburg defined a
section 2 violation in a case involving an attack on a multi-membered districting
scheme in terms of whether a single-membered districting remedy was available.
Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 51. Without serious reasoning, and certainly without
consideration of alternative vote aggregation frameworks, the Court extended this
framework to challenges to single-membered schemes in Growe v. Emison, 507
U.S. 25 (1993).
72. See East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd., 424 U.S. at 639 (distinguishing the "rule" articu-
lated in Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971), from "constitutional grounds").
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the number of cases in which the federal courts would intervene7 3-an
approach that, while practical on its face, is as difficult to justify on fairness
grounds as one that only allows lawsuits to proceed if the relevant jurisdiction's
name begins with the first ten letters of the alphabet. The comparatively race-
neutral74 nature of multi-membered districts with vote aggregation schemes
other than "one vote per slot" would seem to be a serious asset, given the feder-
al judiciary's increasing chariness toward race-conscious remedies in any
setting.75 Furthermore, it has never been clear why a racial minority group
otherwise sufficiently numerous to affect election results but whose votes are
submerged by ferocious bloc voting deserve a remedy only if the group lives in
segregated housing patterns.76
A lesson of this Essay, however, is that the limitations of empirical tools
should play a role in this debate. At least on the quantitative end, the empirical
difficulties in the redistricting area are getting worse, not better. We should
respond by looking for ways to depend less on the empirics. As explained above,
multi-membered districts with vote aggregation schemes other than "one vote
per slot" can allow for more fluid combinations of voters and vote preferences,
decreasing the need for fine judgments on difficult empirical questions such as
the strength and likely longevity of racial bloc voting,7 the likelihood and
73. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51 (citing James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee,
From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden, Have the White Suburbs
Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGs L.J. 1, 55-57 (1982)); Wal-
ter L. Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment: Multimember Districts and Fair Repre-
sentation, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 666, 696 & n.135 (1972)).
74. Cf Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-
Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 308 (1996) (stating that under current law, " [t]he
remedy for a section 2 violation is race-conscious districting"). Multi-membered
districts can be race-neutral because they require the drawing of fewer race-
conscious lines. For example, if a municipality elects five aldermen at large but
uses limited or cumulative voting, it need not draw any district lines.
75. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 988 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he
district court erred in employing a race-conscious remedy before utilizing race-
neutral alternatives.").
76. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (holding that in a section 2 case a
plaintiff must demonstrate that a minority group is large and compact enough to
constitute a majority of a single-membered district). By way of explanation: In
Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff challenging a multi-
membered districting scheme on the grounds of vote dilution could not succeed
unless she showed that her minority group was sufficiently numerous and
geographically compact to constitute a majority of a single-membered district.
Thus, if a minority group's housing patterns are geographically dispersed, the law
provides no remedy against vote dilution even if voting patterns are racially
polarized such that the minority group lacks all ability to elect candidates of
choice. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 46-51.
77. See Greiner, supra note 13, at 482-83.
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uniformity of partisan swing,78 and the effect of the message of racial essential-
ism that bizarrely shaped districts send to voters.79 As also explained above, if
limited or cumulative voting methods are adopted, voter coalitions will be able
to adapt more flexibly to changes in racial or partisan preferences.
Alternative vote aggregation schemes have drawbacks. Sometimes they are
unpopular after they are initially implemented, and they do not always lead to
the election of a candidate of minority race.so Perhaps most intriguingly, the use
of alternative aggregation schemes can in certain situations induce political
parties to adopt game-theoretic strategic behavior that leads to what is essential-
ly a bipartisan lockup."' Nevertheless, perhaps we judge and redistrict best when
we judge and redistrict least. The increasingly apparent empirical challenges in
the redistricting process provide an additional reason to explore systems that
would allow us to do less of both.
78. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 245 (2001).
79. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
8o. See United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ohio 2009)
(approving a city's proposal to remedy a section 2 violation by adopting a limited
voting scheme); Patrick O'Donnell, Euclid Schools Have First Election Since Court
Settlement, But Remains All White, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 4, 2009, 4:17 PM),
http://www.cleveland.com/politics/index.ssf/2oo9/11/post_4.html (reporting that
all three white incumbents were reelected). Perhaps the fact that these schemes do
not always result in the election of candidates of minority race is a good thing;
schemes that work too well might be constitutionally suspect.
81. See, e.g., Jack Sawyer & Duncan MacRae, Jr., Game Theory and Cumulative Voting
in Illinois: 1902-1954, 56 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 936 (1962). "Bipartisan lockup" is the
division of seats on an elected body among two political parties in a way resistant
to changes in voter preferences. On the lockup phenomenon in general, see
Richard H. Pildes & Samuel Issacharoff, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, So STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
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